The paper summarises recent developments occurred in Kazakstan while transition to the marked-oriented economy, especially in the industrial sector.
Introduction
One subject of global importance in the foreseeable future is the extraction of rich oil and gas resources in the Central Asian countries and the potential effect ef that process on the re-establishment of international links and markets. The present paper illuminates some key aspects of the current development of oil and gas industry of Kazakstani, one of the most economically significant states in the region, and the role that country could play in regional and international affairs in view of the newly emerging geopolitical situation around the Caspian oil, Several factors make the future of Central Asia's external dynamics particularlychallenging. First, the potential economic significance of the region, especially the a MinistryofEconomy,RepublicofKazakstan
The gap betwe¢ n expectations and eutcomes underlines yet again the difficulties of making fOrecasts during and after a period of rapid structural change. This is true of the Western market economies, where the short-term forecasting models still do not seem to have absorbed the consequences of the extensive deregulation that occurred in the 1980s. But it is even more valid fbr those countries undergoing complete systemic transformation and 1arge-scale restructuring of their economies.
Virtuagly all government and independent forecasts failed to anticipate the depth and length of the depression that followed the onset of the transition process in 1992 and after, Most of the forecasts made for the transition economies are at best infomied judgments and in some cases little more than working, or hopefu1, assumptions. This is not surprising and, indeed, is unavoidable.
The recovery in Kazakstan has been based to a very large extent on the revival of extractive industry. Although the development of the service sector is one ofthe most important and conspicuous aspects of the transition process, its weight in the economy of Kazakstan is still relatively small. Industry, on the other hand, was excessively 1arge in the economy before 1992, and although parts of the capital stock may be economically redundant, it sti11 had the capacity to recover sooner and more quickly than other sectors. On ayerage industrial production continued to fa11, however the drop in industrial output in 1995 was much smaller than in 1994: -7.9% as compared with -28.5%. In this context it should also be noted that the evidence is that although the private sector is playing a leading role in thls process, the recovery is not confined to private enterprises. Anticipated productivity gains will be also due to general improvements in efficiency resulting from the restructuring of output, the shedding of redundant labour, and the adoption of new production methods. Those are often going in coojunction with investment in new and more up-todate machinery and equipment and with broadening usage of advanced methods of management.
Assessing the relative importance of these various factors is a matter for separate research. But it seems reasonable to assume that the supplyside improvements in industry would be an important pre-condition for Kazakstan being able to take advantage ofthe new opportunities for rapid export growth to the international markets.
Another important development in the transitional economy of Kazakstan in 1995 was a sharp decline in rate of inflation, by much more than was a year ago. Annual inflation is proving to be 60.9%, as compared with 1,258% in 1994.
Since inflation appears to haye monetary nature it is amenable to monetary stabilisation policy, as modern studies of transition in Eastern Europe and FSU have shown. The current rate of infiation in 1996 (about 2.5% per month) does not, fbr example, appear to be a serious constraint on fixed investment. The deceleration of inflation was clearly heiped to, among other factors, the rise in output and productivity in extracting sector.
By However, the infiows into Kazakstan consist ofa wide range of types of capital, from FDI, through portfblio investment to medium-and long-term bank credits. Short-term obligations appear to be a small proportion of the total and easily covered by reserves. Considerable progress was made in l995 with stabilising the Kazak economy, and the increasing optimism about the possibility of a retum to growth in 1996 seems to be supported by a slightly emerged recovery of industrial output in summer and early autumn.
In the mid-1996 Industrial production fe11 7.9% in 1995 (28.5% in 1994, 14.8% in 1993 and 13.8% in 1992). The sectors most affected have been light industry, machine building, metalworking and the production of construction materials, with decreases ranging from 45% to 55% (in 1994). Along with a sharp decline in industrial output between 1992 and 1994, industry's share in GDP fe11 from 42% to less than 34% over the same peried. The fact that industry now doesn't account for the largest share of Kazakstan's economic output reflects not only the sharp contraction in some sectors of the industrial economy, but the increases in the shares of trade and services. Probably, that phenomenon brings some eyidence of progress to the market economy.
However, in the foreseen perspective the economy is forced to be increasingly oriented towards the exploitation and processing of the country's raw materiais, and extracting industrial sector should maintain its dQminant position. Obviously, such situation taking shape, as the strengthening orientation of the economy towards the production of raw materials to the detriment efproduction of final goods does not promote the conversion of potentially rich Kazakstan into a state with profitable economy based on the principles of high technelogy.
The State of Energy Sector After Russia and Ukraine, Kazakstan is the third largest energy producer 7I The JapaneseSociety forSlavic and East European Studies KANTARBAYEVA ET AL, among the fbrmer Soviet Republics. Its share of the FSU's overall energy production in the eighties stood at about 5.5%. The major primary energy source is coal, which accounts for 50-55% of the primary energy consumed in the Republic. Petroleum takes second place with about one-third of the total, foliowed by natural gas with some 13-15%. Thus far, 169 hydrocarbon deposits have been discovered in the Republic, of which 87 aie oil fields, 17 gas fields, 30 gas and oil, 25 oil and gas condensate, and 10 oil condensate. These are concentrated in Western Kazakstan. Besides the known oil and gas basins, there are several sedimentary basins in Kazakstan which have either been inadequately examined, or not surveyed at all. These include northern Turgai, Aral, central Syr-Darya, Shu-Sarysu, Iii, Balkhash, South Dzhungar, Alakol, Zaisan and the Irtysh depression.
Despite being rich in indigenous energy sources and an important fuel and power producer, Kazakstan is a net importer of energy. This anomalous situation is the result of three main factors. Firstly, Kazakstan's energy sector is highly integrated with the neighbouring Repubiies. Energy distribution was not planned in terms of the requirements for an "internal market" for Kazakstan, but rather to satisfy demand at the closest consumption area, anywhere in the FSU.
Secondly, as a result of the investment priorities drawn up in Moscow as well as the lack of hard currency, the oil and gas industry was increasingly unable to obtain access to the most modern technology. As a consequence, old equipment and the inadequate maintenance of the existing infrastructure increased inefficiency and resulted in Kazakstan producing far below its potential.
Thirdly, the price structure fbr energy was highly distorted, This weakened the incentive to fbcus on energy savings and effectively subsidised the inethcient use of available resources.
The government has consequently decided on a programme which sheuld make the country energy selfisufficient by the year 2ooO. This will be done by an all-round improvement in energy management: identifying more efficient ways of meeting the country's energy nceds and increasing the local exploration of energy sources. However at the present time Kazakstan is importing missing amounts of energy from Russia and Kyrgyzstan. At the end of 1995, Kazakstan had proven oil and gas condensate reserves of 3 billion tons (21 ,9 billion 137-litre barrels). Forecast eyaluations of reserves achieve 7 billion tons of oil, Most of the reserves are concentrated in relatiyely few fields, with the ten biggest fields representing around 90% of known oil reserves. Given the low level of exploration done during the Soviet period, rnore areas are thought to contain oil and are being examined,
The huge oil deposits fbund on the shelf of the Caspian Sea are becoming an unprecedented challenge for further development. The Caspian Sea is a true reservoir of natural treasures. Marine waters of the north-eastern part of the Caspian Sea conceal the greater of possible oil reserves of Kazakstan.
The JapaneseSociety forSlavic andEastEuropeanStudies KANTIARB,NYEVA ET AL. three-year geological study of the region's oil potential, with KCS expecting exploratory drilling to begin in 1997 and production to start by 2ooO. Recently the international consortium KCS has completed its survey of Kazakstan's offshore oilfields on the Caspian Sea shelf. That was the first stage of the surveying project. The research work will be completed by May 1997. A new consonium will be created for the next stage of the preject, which involves prospecting, operational drilling and extracting hydrocarbons from the oilfields. Preliminary negotiations on this are currently being held with foreign firms.
Although no exhaustive survey of the region's oil potential has yet been done, preliminary data suggest that there is a lot of oil. Estimates range from 26 billion to 60 billion barrels. The low end of the estimate would more than double Kazakstan's current reserves, placing the Republic in the same league as Russia. At the high end of the estimate, Kazakstan would have the equivalent of over 85% of Kuwait's current oil reserves. The area is also thought to contain 2 trillion cubic metres of gas, which would more than double the Republic's current gas reserves. The efficient development of these deposits call fbr the use of advanced equipment and technology, and will require huge investments. In all, the governrnent has plans for the development of more than 40 oil fields with foreign companies.
Elf is involved in fiye-year exploration programme at the rllemir field, between Karachaganak and Ibngiz; which can be extended to 30 years.
The three biggest agreements concluded so far will result in significant investment in Kazakstan: about $20 billion by Chevron over 40 years, $6 billion by British Gas and Agip over a ten-year period and possibly up to $3 billion from Elf. Most of the funds will be spent on drilling and production facilities, but a portion wili be invested in environmental protection measures and local social development projects. in 1993-1996. By the year 20oo, as a consequence of the deals signed so fatr, Kazakstan's oil exports are likely to be more than triple the 1 992 level, which should result in addi'tional hard currency inflows of close to $3 billion annuaily.
In the recent years production of oil in the Republic refrains on more or less stable level thanks to investments, which were made on replacement of obsolete oil equipment.
This was also promoted by conclusion ef contracts with international companies and adoption of legislative act packages for settlement of transactions with foreign investors. In 1995, Kazakstan adopted a new oil and gas law which will serve as a crucial shift in attracting fbreign investment. ParticularIy, the law provides a broad possibilities for competitive price offering on energy projects. Besides, according to the law, the Kazak authorities may grant exploration rights by means of tender, as well as through direct negotiations. Transactions may be contracted through establishment of joint ventures, production-sharing arrangements and various service agreements. Presently, practically each a little bit attractive preject for mastering any oii deposit on the tenitory of the Republic has an international partner. Nevenheless development goes with hardly noticeable pace. This is because Kazakstan still did not find profitable yersion of an access to international markets of oil and did not make a decision relating to the projects of oil refinery, which are considered as alternative.
Geologically, bowls of Kazakstan contain countless wealth, however geographically, from the position of oil transportation to international markets, the Republic is located extremely unfavourable.
Kazakstan is landlocked. Other unfavourable circumstance is that considerable part of oil and gas resources is distant from refinery enterprises and suffers from the lack of domestic pipelines. Resources are 1ocated in the western part of the Republic, mainly in Sub-Caspian region and partially in Central Kazakstan (Kumkol), thousands of kilometres fatr away from the main centres of their consumption at the north-east and southeast. From 120 of explored oil deposits 112 are on the west, rnainly in Aktau and Atyrau regions, near eastern coast of the Caspian Sea.
Dienculties with crude oil transportation from Kazakstan are conditioned by at least two reasons. One of them is connected immediately with pipelines. Currently pumping Kazak and Russian oil on the territory of the Repubiic is realised by four pipelines. The first is laid eastward and Wk)st-Siberian oil from Russia comes through it to Pavlodar and Shymkent refinery factories. By the second, Kazakstan's oil from Aktyubinskneft supplier is fed to Orsk for Russian refiners (supplies along this route are regarded only as compensations, like payments fbr West-Siberian oil received by Kazakstan). The third delivers oil from Wk)stern Kazakstan to Samara, the centre of Russian conduit system. From Samara crude oil may be forwarded nonhward, to export terminals on the Baltic Sea, westward, through pipeline of "Druzhba" to Central Europe, and southward, to the Black Sea. The fourth line runs out from Atyrau region to Astrakhan in delta of Vblga, and in future may be used for construction of transportation system from Western Kazakstan to export terminal of Novorossiysk on the Black Sea.
The other problem, partly being a consequence of the first one, concerns quotas. Now, every year Kazakstan is forced to apply to the Russian Ministry of Fuel and Energy to receive quotas, quantifying the oil, which Russian operator [[lransneft will pass through pipeline to Samara. One quota is granted fbr the The JapaneseSociety
OIL SECTOR OF KAZAKST:AN export of crude oil outside of CIS, and the second one for delivery of oil to consumers in Russia and the FSU states. Since prices on oil in the countries of the FSU are, as a rule, lower than in the West and buyers in these countries often do not pay for supplies in due course, the export to "near abroad" scarcely may be a kind of tempting option. Therefore it is clear, that one, controlling physical export of oil, always aspires to reserve the greater share of export quotas, allocated fbr "remote abroad", for himself. In 1995 year Kazakstan received an export quota amounted in 3.5 million tons (70,OOO bpd). In addition, the Republic was given a permission for transportation of 2.5 million tons of crude oil (50, OOO bpd) fields te the temiinals in Novorossiysk is 1 ,6oo km, with a capacity of56 million tons a year, Chevron also participates in the preject as a guarantor for transportation ofoil along this way. List of participants of the preject underwent changes seyeral times. Last updates in the list and in breakdown of shares were made in April of 1996. 0riginally, the founders of the Consortium, Russia, Kazakstan and Oman Oil Company had equal shares, however later the cofounders of the CPC have had their combined share cut to 50%, with the other 50% shared between Russian, Kazak, European, and USA oii and gas cempanies. CPC now also unites other oil companies fbr implementation of the project of pipeline construction, which is estimated to cost $2 billion. Their shares are distributed as follows: Kazakstan 19%; Russia 24%; Oman 7%; MunaiGas l.75%; LukOil l2.5%; Rosneft 7.5%; Chevron 15%; Mobil 7.5%; British Gas 2%; Agip 2%; and Oryx 1.75%, Ultimately it became that Russia possesses with 44% of shares in Caspian Pipeline Consortium, and the American companies follow it. After hot debates Russian transport company ofTransneft became an operator of the preject and will direct it in the financial issues. American company of Wilmex will be a general contractor of the preject. Pipeline, intended to connect Caspian and Black seas, will ceme into operation in two years and a half. Latest agreements, signed as a result of negotiations, will allow to finish 2. AIOC is made up of a consoitium of 1 1 Western oil companies. They are developing the Azexi and Chirag fields as well as a deepwater part of the Gunashli fields in the Caspian Sea as part of a prodnction agreement signed with the Azerbaijan government in September 1995. Obvieusly, in the short-and middle-run Kazak oil will be transmitted mainly through the Russian tenitory toward terminals of Novorossiysk. However, in the long-run, as the volumes of oil extraction in Kazakstan increase, capacities of Russia to transport Kazak oil will decrease. This circumstance is brought about both by the limited technological capacities of pipelines and by natural economic competition. Exports of crude will remain the major source of budget revenues of Russian economy in foreseeable future, and therefore Russia objectively is not 1ikely to be interested in unlimited promotion ef her competitors on the international oil market. Bearing this in mind, Kazakstan should not put all her eggs in one basket, and it would be usefu1 to consider alternatiye routes for transportation of oil. The fo11owing principles for selection of specific route may serye as guiding ones: reliable investment, security issues, competition with other oil producers and geopolitics.
The alternative to Baku-Novorossiysk way is the Baku-Ceyhan3 pipe}ine which has been proposed by rlUrkey as a route to Turkey's Mediterranean coast. Its length is planned to be 1,650 km and to pass throughAzerbaijan and Georgia. The pipeline, first proposed in 1993 but later overshadowed by another deal fbr a pipeline via Georgia to the Black Sea by an international consortium to develop Caspian oilfields, could cost about $2 billion. Competing with Russia and taking objective environmental issues as a pretext4, Turkey is attempting to promote the pipeline to prevent further oil movement via her narrow Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits, through which up to 32 million tons of mostly Russian oil is shipped annually. Current Central Asian and Caspian oil development projects involve the Black Sea, and therefore the straits, as the only outlet fbr the oil, carrying 62 million tons per year at fu}] stream. Turkey offers Baku-Ceyhan proposal to become a feasible gateway for the Caspian oil. Baku-Ceyhan line was designed to carry up to 45 rnillion tons of crude annually.
3. Ceyhan has been idle since the twin Kirkuk-Ylimurtalik pipeline was closed in 1990.
4. According to the Turlcish estimates the eil traffic through the straits could be increased by a maxirnum 20%, because the current annual oil passage has been posing a danger to the 12 million people living in Istanbul, Tb prevent further oil tanker movements Tuckey resnicted tanker navigation through the straits after a fire caused by a collision in the Bosphorus in 1994. Responding to the Turkish challenge and not willing to lose the increasing profits from the transportation of Caspian oil through her territory, Russia together with Bulgaria and Greece put forward the initiative of constructing the Burgas-Alexandropolis pipeline. The essence of their project is to bypass the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, thus evading imposed limits on the passage of large-capacity tankers, and deliver oil from Noyorossiysk to the Bulgarian port of Burgas by tankeg and from there pump it over the pipelines to Greek terminals in Alexandropolis. Between 4e-60 million tons of oil are expected to be carried annually and there will be storage facilities at both ports. The pipeline's length will be about 300 km and it will cost up to $7oo million. According to estimates the construction can be completed within three years. It is likely that neither Turkish and Greek variants of pipeline are met with unambiguous enthusiasm, since each of them bears obvious shortcomings. From one hand, it is tme, that the Greek pipeline is much shorter than the Turkish one and it will run through the quiet countries, while some parts of the Turkish pipeline will be built in turbulent areas of Transcaucasia and rebel Kurdish territories, Besides, complex orography makes cost per kilometTe of the Turkish pipeline more expensive as compared with the Greek one. But from the other hand, in case of the Greek project, transportation includes usage of tankers from Novorossiysk to Burgas which ultimately increases its cost. And finally, the part of the route ieading to Novorossiysk runs across not completely controllable Russian Northern Caucasus. Appraisals of econornic efficiency of both projects given by their initiators contradict each other. Russia, Bulgaria and Greece assure that their pipeline will be at least ten times cheaper, while Meanwhile Iran can independently solve the problem of shortages at her north. Recent exploration of deposits at the southern part ofCaspian Sea raised hopes, that offShore resources could serve as viable sources of domestic crude. Besides, similar to Russia, lran herself is one of the main world oil exporter and that implies the pQssibilities of promotion of Kazak exports from her side also suffer from inevitable restrictions. Moreover, search for 1arge-scale financing such schemes may be impeded without improvements of American-Iranian relations. Therefore, it seems that the option described above should be considered as undoubtedly useful, but temporary, short-run, palliative measure. However, analysing various prejects proposed, it should be taken into account that Moscow, explicitly or implicitly, will be against any schemes, involving oil export not through the Russian pipelines.
As to the eastward direction, Kazakstan examines possibilities to lay pipeline of which is appraised to be 6 million tons, that makes about 30% of Kazakstan's total production. Oil of Buzachi is very viscous and should be heated or mixed with light one before transportation through pipeline. However, since oil is also extracted in other regions, in particular at rllengiz and is sold on more high prices, the oil of Buzachi is actually excluded from the export quotas, to great disappointment of local producers. In the beginning of 1993 a group of Japanese companies, in which number are [Ibyo Engineering, Mitsui and Mitsubishi, won tender on construction of refining factory in Mangystau. The first phase of the project includes installation of unit with output capacity 3 million tons a year and estimated cost of about $1.5 billion, but the construction still not begun till now. So, if relevant resoiute investments are to be made Kazakstan may boost up her oil production te substantial level in fbreseeable future.
Completing the discussion of oil sector we should pay attention to another important issueurgent necessity of shift towards the more deep processing of oil, rather than promote traditional refinery technology. That is much more profitable in view of expensive transportation from landlocked Kazakstan. For instance, ethylene and ethyiene oxide might become prospective semi-products for new high-tech industrial oil chemistry. In this connection close co-operation with such chemically advanced countries as Japan seems of great importance in view of funher organising the ethcient export of cempetitive synthetic materials. There is significant petential for the further development of Kazakstan's gas industry. The Republic consumes seme 15-16 billion cubic metres of gas but produces less than half of this volume (Fig. 4) . In 1995 gas output was just over 4.8 billion cubic metres, of which Kazakgaz produced 2.58 billion and MunaiGas over 2.2 biliion. The rest is covered by imports from Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Russia. It is projected that the demand for gas within the country could reach 28 billion cubic metres by the year 2ooO. As in the case of oil, Kazakstan's gas is produced mainly in the north-western part of the Republic, while the main consumption areas are in the south. Fig. 5 presents proven gas reserves of Kazakstan and some other gas-extracting countries of the world. The main producing field is Karachaganak, one of the largest in the world. Karachaganak is located in the north-west of Kazakstan. Recoverable reserves are estimated at 1.33 trillion cubic metres of naturai gas, 644 million tonnes of gas condensate and 189 million tons of crude. The field is across the border of Russia's Orenburg gas field, and due to its location and the inadequate processing facilities, the gas is presently exported to Russia. Current output is rather small: about 13 mMion cubic metres a day in gas and 85,OOO bpd in liquids. This is set to increase significantly, however, fo11owing the deal with British Gas and Agip to exploit the field. Recently Russian LukOil has taken a 15% stake, while the remaining 85% will be split between Italy's Agip and British Gas.
ConcEusion
Kazakstan today is a country in flux. And it is premature tojudge the current strategy unequivocaliy either a success or a failure. What is clear is that Kazak leaders are constrained by a quite ditlferent set of concerns than those guiding policy in Russia, let alone in the Eastern or Central Europe. Like all nations in transition, Kazakstan is groping for policies that will fi11 general functions of reforming in a manner compatible with local realities, We believe that finding the reasonable routes for delivering crude oil from the rich deposits of land-locked Central Asia to the international markets and resolution of the pending status of Caspian Sea must be recognised as essential constituents of Eurasian security as a whole. 
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